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Abstract
Argumentation is now a very fertile area of research in Ar-
tiﬁcial Intelligence. Yet, most approaches to reasoning with
arguments in AI are based on a normative perspective, re-
lying on intuition as to what constitutes correct reasoning,
sometimesaided bypurpose-builthypothetical examples. For
these models to be useful in agent-human argumentation,
theycanbeneﬁtfromanalternative, positivist perspectivethat
takes into account the empirical reality of human reasoning.
To give a ﬂavour of the kinds of lessons that this methodology
can provide, we report on a psychological study exploring
simple reinstatement in argumentation semantics. Empirical
results show that while reinstatement is cognitively plausible
in principle, it does not yield full recovery of the argument
status, a notion not captured in Dung’s classical model. This
result suggests some possible avenues for research relevant to
making formal models of argument more useful.
Introduction
Argumentation has become a very fertile area of research
in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (Rahwan & Simari 2009). A highly
inﬂuentialframework for studyingargumentation-based rea-
soning has been introduced by Dung (Dung 1995). An argu-
mentation framework is simply a pair AF = hA;*i where
A is a set of arguments and * A  A is a defeat relation
between arguments. This approach abstracts away from the
origin of individual arguments and their internal structures,
and focuses instead on the defeat relationship between them.
Figure 1 shows an example textual argument and its cor-
responding graph structure. This structure is the canonical
example for the notion of reinstatement. In particular, while
argument A is defeated by argument B, the presence of C
reinstates A since C undermines A’s only defeater.
Given an argument framework (or graph), a semantics as-
signs a status to each argument. Classically, we distinguish
between arguments that are accepted and those that are not
(Dung 1995). Other approaches distinguish accepted, re-
jected and undecided arguments (Caminada 2006a).
In some cases, all semantics agree on the result. For ex-
ample, in Figure 1, all classical argumentation semantics
agree that we should accept C (for lack of any counter-
argument), reject B (because there is a good reason to), and
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A: Tweety flies because it is a bird.
B: Tweety does not fly, because it is a penguin.




Figure 1: Defeat structure with reinstatement
accept A (since every objection to it has been defeated).
When there are cycles, different semantics may prescribe
different results.
Most models of argument evaluation in AI are normally
based on a normative perspective, relying on intuition as
to what constitutes correct reasoning, sometimes aided by
purpose-built hypothetical examples. As we will argue be-
low, there are limits to relying solely on this approach.
The main aim of this paper is to promote the use of psy-
chological experiment as a methodological tool for inform-
ing and validating intuitions about argument-based reason-
ing. To give a ﬂavour of the kinds of lessons that this
methodology can provide, we report on an empirical study
exploring simple reinstatement in Dung’s argumentation se-
mantics. The study reveals that while simple reinstatement
is cognitively plausible, it does not fully restore the status
of the reinstated argument. This notion is not captured in
Dung’s classical model of reinstatement, thus our result mo-
tivates work on new probabilistic semantics.
The study presented in this paper is not meant to consti-
tute a comprehensive psychological assessment of Dung’s
semantics –this is beyond the scope of any single paper.
But the results do show how psychological studies can pro-
vide new insights. Such results are relevant not only to the
evaluation of existing semantics, but also to the design of
new semantics. They are also relevant to the design of soft-
ware agents that can argue persuasively with humans, or that
can provide reliable support to humans in evaluating argu-
ments (e.g. on top of argument diagramming tools). Before
presenting our experimental results, we ﬁrst review current
methodologies for validating argumentation semantics.Origins and Benchmarks of Semantics
The evaluation of semantics in the argumentation literature
falls into two main categories: the example-based approach,
and the principle-based approach, as discussed below.
The Example-based Approach
Most semantics for argumentation-based reasoning in AI are
based on intuition as to what constitutes correct reasoning.
This intuition is expressed formally in a precise manner,
making it amenable to formal analysis. To test this intu-
ition, a typical article presents a hypothetical scenario (e.g.
on whether Tweety can ﬂy) that correspond to a particular
argument structure (e.g. argument defeat or reinstatement).
Then, authors indicate the kinds of conclusions a system
ought to draw, based on intuition pertaining to the partic-
ular example at hand. Subsequently, the semantics is shown
to draw the desired conclusion.
However, oftenonecanconstructotherexamples, exhibit-
ing the same logical structure, but in which the previous
semantics leads to counter-intuitive results (e.g. Horty de-
voted a whole paper to demonstrate counter-intuitive results
withﬂoatingconclusionsindefaultreasoning(Horty2002)).
This motivates work on new semantic criteria to capture the
new example, or class of examples. For example, CF2 se-
mantics (Baroni, Giacomin, & Guida 2005) was conceived
to deal with the problematic behaviour of preferred seman-
tics in argument graphs with odd-length cycles. Semi-stable
semantics (Caminada 2006b) was introduced mainly to deal
with cases in which no stable extension exists.
The above approach to designing argumentation seman-
tics has been recently termed the example-based approach
(Baroni & Giacomin 2007). More importantly, examples act
as the main tool for comparing one semantics with another.
Baroni and Giacomin make a compelling case for the limi-
tations of the example-based approach to semantics.
“example-based comparisons ...are affected by the in-
herent limitation of relying more on intuition than on
formally stated principles. In fact, even in relatively
simple examples there may not be a general agreement
on the “desired” outcome, due to different underlying
intuitions” (Baroni & Giacomin 2007)
This is consistent with Prakken, who argues that due to the
wide-spread differences in underlying intuitions:
“it is better to use intuitions not as critical tests but as
generators for further investigation” (Prakken 2002)
Thus, it seems that there is a recognised difﬁculty in rely-
ing on intuition alone as the benchmark for designing and
evaluating semantics for argumentation.
The Principle-based Approach
Motivated by the observations discussed above, a number
of authors have recently advocated a more systematic, ax-
iomatic (or principle-based) approach (Baroni & Giacomin
2007; Caminada & Amgoud 2007). In this approach, one
analyses whether a semantics satisﬁes certain ‘principles’ or
‘quality postulates.’ Baroni and Giacomin present criteria
such as the reinstatement criterion, according to which an
argument must be included in any extension that reinstates
it. Another example is the directionality criterion which re-
quires that an argument’s status should only be affected by
the status of its defeaters. Such postulates can be used for
systematic comparison between semantics.
Caminada recently provided postulates for the notion of
reinstatement in order to characterise the labelling of argu-
ments in an argument graph (in, out, and undecided) (Cami-
nada 2006a). One postulate states that an argument must be
‘in’ if and only if all of its defeaters are ‘out.’ Another pos-
tulate states that an argument must be ‘out’ if and only if at
least one of its defeaters is ‘in.’ This enabled characterising
different semantics by the kinds of labellings they allow.
The principle-based approach provides a signiﬁcant im-
provement, since it enables making statements that tran-
scend individual examples and characterise semantics more
generally. Having said that, the source of the general pos-
tulates themselves remains an intuition as to what correct
reasoning ought to look like. In summary, most existing
work on argumentation semantics, be it example-based or
principle-based, is mostly normative. Research on argumen-
tation semantics is rarely based on empirical evidence about
how people actually reason with conﬂicting information.
Towards an Empirical Approach
There remains a largely unexplored source of intuition and
validation for argumentation semantics, namely the psychol-
ogy of human reasoning. We refer to this as the empirical
approach to argumentation semantics. It aims at cognitively
plausible (as opposed to normatively optimal) semantics.
Presumably, people’s capacity to perform reliable com-
mon sense reasoning in the context of conﬂicting informa-
tion is the ultimate inspiration to researchers who want to
build intelligent machines. It is quite striking that very little
work in the ‘argumentation in AI’ community has investi-
gated how people reason with argument structures.
One might ask: why should we care about how humans
reason? One answer to this question is that, while deduc-
tive reasoning is inherently normative (e.g. helps us discover
mathematical theorems), nonmonotonic reasoning and other
common sense reasoning tasks are inherently ‘psychologis-
tic’ (Pelletier & Elio 2005). That is, they are deﬁned by what
people do in real common sense situations, since there is not
necessarily one obviously correct normative answer.
A second answer to the above question is that cognitively
realistic reasoning is more successful when interacting with
humans. For example, in the context of human-agent nego-
tiation, it was shown that software agents that account for
human reciprocity outperform agents that play the norma-
tive equilibrium strategies prescribed by game-theory (Gal
& Pfeffer 2007). In the context of agent-human argumen-
tation, it has also been argued that emotional arguments are
more successful than purely rational arguments at persuad-
ing people (Mazzotta, de Rosis, & Caroﬁglio 2007). More
generally, identifying which argument evaluation criteria are
cognitively plausible can potentially enable building agents
that are able to better argue with humans. It remains an open
question, however, whether any of the existing models of ar-
gument evaluation in AI are cognitively plausible.(a) (b) (c)
H1: Seeing (b) after (a) 
lowers a subject’s 
confidence in A’s conclusion
H2: Seeing (c) after (b) 
increases a subject’s 
confidence in A’s conclusion
H3: Seeing (c) after (a) does 
not change a subject’s 
confidence in A’s conclusion
(e)
H4: Seeing (e) after (d) 
lowers a subject’s  
confidence in B’s conclusion
(d)
A B A A B C B B C
Figure 2: Summary of Hypotheses
Plausibility of Simple Reinstatement
We now report on a study of the cognitive plausibility of
argument evaluation criteria for the basic notion of argu-
ment reinstatement (recall Figure 1). Abstractly, this struc-
ture is deﬁned in the following argumentation framework:
AF = hfA;B;Cg;f(B;A);(C;B)gi in which argument A
is attacked by argument B but reinstated by argument C.
Hypotheses
We are interested in testing three hypotheses on how a sub-
ject’s conﬁdence changes when attacking and reinstating ar-
guments are presented.
H1: An attack on an argument lowers the conﬁdence
that a subject has in the conclusion of that argument.
That is, the conﬁdence that a subject has in the conclu-
sion of argument A is higher than the conﬁdence the
subject has in the conclusion of argument A when it is
attacked by argument B.
Hypothesis H1 simply tests the cognitive plausibility of the
basic notion of defeat, which has been subject to much re-
search (Byrne 1999; Ford 2005).
H2: Reinstatement of an argument raises the conﬁ-
dence that a subject has in the conclusion of the ar-
gument from the level of conﬁdence that the subject
has when the argument is attacked. That is, the conﬁ-
dence that a subject has in the conclusion of argument
A is higher when it is attacked by argument B but rein-
stated by argument C compared to the conﬁdence that
the subject has in the conclusion of argument A when
it is attacked by argument B but not reinstated.
Hypothesis H2 explicitly investigates the effect of reinstate-
ment. It simply states that reinstatement helps the reinstated
argument by improving our conﬁdence in it. It says noth-
ing about how the status of a reinstated argument compares
to an argument that has never been attacked. This is a non-
trivial question. Consider the example in Figure 1. Suppose
apersononlyhearsthestatement“Tweetyﬂiesbecauseitisa
bird.” Here, the person may presume, with some conﬁdence,
that Tweety indeed ﬂies. Suppose a second person hears all
three arguments, namely that “Tweety ﬂies because it is a
bird,” that “Tweety does not ﬂy, because it is a penguin,” and
that “the observation that Tweety is a penguin is not reli-
able.” Would this person have more or less conﬁdence in
Tweety’s ﬂight? Classical Dung semantics all agree that the
reinstated argument should be accepted, and have the same
status as the undefeated argument.
However, there are two other sensible intuitions about this
problem. On one hand, we might say that the ﬁrst per-
son should have higher conﬁdence in Tweety’s ﬂight, since
she was not exposed to any potential counter-arguments that
may raise her doubt. On the other hand, we might say that
the second person, who saw all three arguments, should have
higher conﬁdence in Tweety’s ability to ﬂy, since he saw that
a possible objection/exception has been ruled out.
Against this background, hypothesis H3 tests whether the
classical assumption, that reinstatement perfectly restores
the argument status, is cognitively plausible.
H3: The conﬁdence that a subject has in the conclusion
of an argument does not change when it is attacked by
an argument but reinstated by another argument. That
is, the conﬁdence that the subject has in the conclusion
of argument A is the same as the conﬁdence in the con-
clusion of argument A when it is attacked by argument
B but reinstated by argument C.
As a manipulation check, we introduce hypothesis H4 to en-
sure that in a reinstatement scenario, the attacking argument
is indeed defeated by the reinstating argument. Hypothesis
H3 is relevant only if hypothesis H4 holds.
H4: In a reinstatement framework A   B   C, an
attack on argument B by argument C lowers the conﬁ-
dence that a subject has in the conclusion of argument
B. Argument A is not revealed to the subject.
The hypotheses above are summarised in Figure 2.
Dependent And Independent Variables
The independent variable (IV) in the experiment is the ar-
gumentation framework presented to the participant. Differ-
ent values to this independent variable are:1 A; A   B;
A   B   C; B; B   C. Natural language arguments are
used to instantiate the independent variable (see below).
The dependent variable (DV) is the conﬁdence marked by
the participant in the conclusion of arguments, argument A
and argument B on a given 7-point interval scale. We used
a 7-point scale (following (Politzer & Bonnefon 2006)) to
mark the conﬁdence, with 1 denoting ‘certainly false’ and 7
denoting ‘certainly true.’ A visual representation of the scale
1Here, we are using A   B to denote an argument graph in
which argument A is defeated by argument B, and A   B   C
to denote the reinstatement graph, etc.with black representing false and white representing true is
given in Figure 3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FALSE TRUE
Figure 3: Visualization of the Scale
Participants
The survey was conducted using questionnaires in paper
form. Random sample of people from ofﬁces, shopping
malls and open spaces in Dubai, UAE were surveyed. There
were two participant groups in this survey. These groups
were labelled G1 and G2. Group G1 had 20 participants
and group G2 had 18 participants totalling 38 participants
in the survey. Group G1 tested hypothesis H1, H2 and H3
whereas group G2 tested hypothesis H4. Following are the
IV value(s) assigned to each group, in sequence. For group
G1, there were three assignments and for group G2, there
were two assignments.
G1 : A; A   B; A   B   C
G2 : B; B   C
Questionnaire Design
There was an introduction in the beginning of the question-
naire informing the participants that the experiment was just
to collect information on how people think. They were in-
formed how much time it would take on an average to solve
the problems. They were also informed that there were no
trick questions and all that the participant had to do was to
mark the answer that they felt correct, on the given scale.
The questionnaire was scrutinized to avoid double-
barrelled questions (questions with more than one question
embedded within them) and leading questions (questions
that suggest the answer or an answer that is intended). All
questions were short and concise to reduce the fatigue ef-
fect. The assignment of participants to questionnaires was
random. All questions used simple common words and the
words were chosen in such a way that they would not be
misinterpreted by the participants.
Thereweresixsetsofnaturallanguagearguments(seeap-
pendix). Each set of arguments contained three arguments.
G1 tested three conditions per argument set. So each partic-
ipant in group G1 responded to 3 (conditions) x 6 (argument
sets) = 18 problems. The order of conditions in each argu-
ment set was ﬁxed and corresponded to the order of the IV
assignments: A, A   B, A   B   C. To reduce the
order effect, half of the questionnaires contained the argu-
ment sets presented in reverse order but preserving the order
of problems within each argument set.
Group G2 used the same argument sets that were used for
group G1, but tested only two conditions per argument set.
So each participant in group G2 responded to 2 (conditions)
x 6 (argument sets) = 12 problems. Again the order of prob-
lem within an argument set was ﬁxed and corresponded to
the order of IV assignment B, B   C. In order to re-
duce the order effect, half of the questionnaires contained
the argument sets presented in reverse order but preserving
the order of problems within an argument set.
The participants were allowed to answer problems only
in the order of the problems as per the questionnaire. It was
mandatory to answer all problems.
Hypothesis Analysis
Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 were tested through an analy-
sisofvariancefeaturingconclusionacceptanceasthedepen-
dent variable, problem as a 3-level predictor, and argument
set as a 6-level measure. Standard contrast analyses were
performed to compare the effects of different levels of the
predictor. H4 was tested using a multivariate test featuring
conclusion acceptance as the dependent variable, problem as
2-level predictor and argument set as 6-level measure.
Results
The base (when argument A is presented alone) acceptance
rating of the conclusion when we average the scores across
the 6 contents was 5.9 (SD = 0.8) whereas acceptance rating
of the defeated conclusion (when argument A is attacked
by argument B) as 4 (SD = 1.4). The acceptance rating of
reinstated (when argument A is attacked by argument B but
reinstated by argument C) was 5.2 (SD = 1.0).
Acceptance ratings were analyzed with a repeated-
measure analysis of variance, with pattern as a 3-level pre-
dictor (base, defeated and reinstated) and 6 measures cor-
responding to the 6 contents. The repeated-measure anal-
ysis of variance detected a signiﬁcant effect of pattern,
F(2;18) = 14:1;p < 0:001;n2
p = 0:61. We found that
this overall effect is due to both the defeat and the reinstate-
ment. As shown by a contrast analysis, ratings in the base
condition were signiﬁcantly higher than ratings in the de-
feated condition, F(1;19) = 26:8;p < 0:001;n2
p = 0:59,
and ratings in the defeated condition were themselves sig-
niﬁcantly lower than ratings in the reinstated condition,
F(1;19) = 9:9;p < 0:005;n2
p = 0:34. Although rein-
statement increased the acceptability of a conclusion, the re-
covery was not perfect. Indeed, the ratings in the reinstated
condition were still signiﬁcantly lower than the ratings in the
base condition, F(1;19) = 9:1;p = 0:007;n2
p = 0:32.
The reliable effect of reinstatement must be related to the
success of the reinstating manipulation, as shown by the re-
sults of the manipulation check. Averaging across 6 con-
tents, the base acceptance ratings of defeaters was 5.1 (SD
= 0.8) and the acceptance ratings for the attacked defeaters
was 4.1 (SD = 0.7). The acceptance ratings for the manip-
ulation check were analyzed with a repeated-measure anal-
ysis of variance, with pattern as 2-level predictor(base de-
feater, attacked defeater), and 6 measures corresponding to
6 contents. The test detected a signiﬁcant effect of pattern
F(6;12) = 3:8;p = 0:02;n2
p = 0:66.
The results from the study thus support hypothesis H1
and H2. That is, when an argument is attacked by another
argument, then the conﬁdence in the conclusion of the ar-
gument being attacked signiﬁcantly falls. The average ac-
ceptance ratings across 6 contents in the base condition is5.9 (SD = 0.8) whereas in the defeated condition it is 4 (SD
= 1.4). We also found that the reinstatement signiﬁcantly
increases the conﬁdence in the conclusion of the argument
being reinstated. We found that the average score across 6
contents in the reinstated condition as 5.2 (SD = 1.0). How-
ever, the results do not support hypothesis H3 which states
that the conﬁdence level in the reinstated condition is the
same as in the base condition.
Discussion
Results show that the notion of reinstatement is cognitively
plausible by supporting hypotheses H1 and H2. This is re-
inforced by the fact that the results support the manipula-
tion check (hypothesis H4) showing that the reinstating ar-
gument effectively defeats the defeater of the reinstated ar-
gument. That is, reinstatement is achieved by defeating the
defeater rather than merely supporting the main argument.
From the perspective of abstract argument evaluation cri-
teria, the reinstatement framework produces the same exten-
sions for all classical semantics. Hence, the empirical results
do not indicate the preference of one semantic over another
(this is an avenue of future research).
Having said that, the results do not support hypothesis
H3, meaning that the recovery from a defeat, by a rein-
statement, is not perfect. On one hand, this phenomenon
is not captured by Dung’s semantics, and a probabilistic ap-
proach to argument evaluation may be more accurate. On
the other hand, the partial recovery is somewhat surpris-
ing, since it is reasonable to expect that people should have
higher conﬁdence in argument A when they see a possible
objection/exception being ruled out. More investigation is
needed to ascertain the precise nature of the cognitive pro-
cesses that lead to this partial recovery. For example, reveal-
ing a defeater might trigger people to think of other possi-
ble objections, thus making full recovery less likely. This
observation is relevant to agent-human argumentation. For
example, an agent arguing with a human may be better off
avoiding discussion that may reveal a defeater, even if the
agent has a counter-argument to that defeater.
Related Work
Johan van Benthem has recently become a strong proponent
of taking empirical ﬁndings from cognitive science seriously
when working in logic at large. He terms this movement the
‘new psychologism’ and states:
‘Logicians analyzing natural language, or computer
scientists modeling common sense, tend to go by their
own intuitions, anecdotal evidence from colleagues,
email surveys of sometimes surprising naiveness, and
other easy procedures that avoid the laboratories and
statistical packages of the world of careful experimen-
tal design. But even so, experimental evidence is rel-
evant, in that these theories can be, and sometimes
are, modiﬁed under pressure of evidence from actual
usage, even when it comes through these home-grown
sources.’ (van Benthem 2008)
In the context of epistemic logic, Pietarinen (Pietarinen
2003) argues for the important role of empirical ﬁndings
from cognitive science in revising our logical conceptions of
knowledge and belief. He argues that “the interplay between
logic and cognition is likely to reach increasingly wider and
become increasingly prominent, encouraging fresh perspec-
tives both from logical and semantic ﬁelds and from cogni-
tive and neuroscientiﬁc communities.”
Pelletier and Elio also argued for the importance of em-
pirical studies of human reasoning in the formalisation of
AI theories of default and inheritance reasoning (Pelletier &
Elio 2005). They present empirical results on how people
deal with benchmark problems in nonmonotonic reasoning,
and identiﬁed a number of cases in which people deviate
from the “AI answer.”
There is also a long history of relevant literature from the
psychology camp. Many psychologists defended the propo-
sition thatformal logic is an important part of human reason-
ing (Braine & O’Brien 1998; Rips 1994). These researchers
argued for the existence of a mental logic that characterises
‘core schemas’ in human abstract reasoning. Another ap-
proach is the so-called mental models theory (Johnson-Laird
1983), which postulates that deductive reasoning is best ex-
plained by abstract models, as opposed to formal logic or
schemas. For example, when people interpret a conditional
“If a card has an A on one side, then it has a 4 on the other,”
they construct a mental representation such as ‘[A] 4.’ A
process of matching then determines the kinds of inferences
people make, and also accounts for difﬁculties in logical rea-
soning. Other approaches to modelling human logical rea-
soning include probabilistic (Chater & Oaksford 2008) and
neural-basedapproaches(Stenning&vanLambalgen2008).
Closer to the present paper, there is a signiﬁcant amount
of literature on the suppression of conditional reasoning.
This literature typically examines the effect of new in-
formation on previously made conclusions (Byrne 1999;
Ford 2005). The degree to which the defeated argument is
suppressed can vary depending on the type of argument and
defeater involved (Politzer & Bonnefon 2006). In the argu-
mentation jargon, this literature focuses on argument defeat.
However, we are not aware of any studies that explore more
complex argument structures, even for simple reinstatement.
Conclusion
By focusing on a very speciﬁc case study, namely simple
reinstatement, we showed how empirical studies can inform
the study of formal argumentation semantics. This positivist
methodology offers a complementary source of inspiration
and validation to the normative, example- and principle-
based approaches typically found in the literature.
Results showed that while reinstatement is cognitively
plausible in principle, it does not yield full recovery of the
argument status, a notion not captured in Dung’s classi-
cal model. Partial recovery is somewhat surprising, since
it is reasonable to expect that people should have higher
conﬁdence in argument A when they see a possible objec-
tion/exception being ruled out. This observation is relevant
to agent-human argumentation: an agent may be better off
avoiding discussion that may reveal a defeater, even if the
agent has a counter-argument to that defeater.The reader should note that the aim of this paper is not
to provide conclusive or comprehensive answers. Indeed, a
different natural language instantiation arguments may lead
to different results in subsequent studies. But the important
lesson remains: psychological methodology can at least give
us a new perspective on the types of problems we face in for-
malising argumentation, and understanding these problems
can be very relevant to making argumentation useful.
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Appendix: Natural Language Arguments
Argument Set 1
A: “The battery of Alex’s car is not working. Therefore, Alex’s car will halt.”
B: “The battery of Alex’s car has just been changed today. Therefore, the battery of
Alex’s car is working.”
C: “The garage was closed today. Therefore, the battery of Alex’s car has not been
changed today.”
Argument Set 2
A: “Louis applied the brake and the brake was not faulty. Therefore, the car slowed
down.”
B: “The brake ﬂuid was empty. Therefore, the brake was faulty.”
C: “The car had just undergone maintenance service. Therefore, the brake ﬂuid was
not empty.”
Argument Set 3
A: “Mary does not moderate her phone usage. Therefore, Mary has a large phone bill.”
B: “Mary has a speech disorder. Therefore, Mary moderates her phone usage.”
C: “Mary is a singer. Therefore, Mary does not have a speech disorder.”
Argument Set 4
A: “John has no way to know Leila’s password. Therefore, Leila’s emails are secured
from John.”
B: “Leila’s secret question is very easy to answer. Therefore, John has a way to know
Leila’s password.”
C: “Leila purposely gave a wrong answer to her secret question. Therefore, Leila’s
secret question is not very easy to answer.”
Argument Set 5
A: “Mike’s laptop does not have anti-virus software installed. Therefore, Mike’s lap-
top is vulnerable to computer viruses.”
B: “Nowadays anti-virus software is always available by default on purchase. There-
fore, Mike’s laptop has anti-virus software.”
C: “Some laptops are very cheap and have minimal software. Therefore, anti-virus
software is not always available by default.”
Argument Set 6
A: “There is no electricity in the house. Therefore, all lights in the house are off.”
B: “There is a working portable generator in the house. Therefore, there is electricity
in the house.”
C: “The fuel tank of the portable generator is empty. Therefore, the portable generator
is not working.”